American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer

American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (2005), by Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, is a Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of the physicist who directed the US atomic bomb program during World War II. From 1943 to 1945, Robert Oppenheimer oversaw the bomb’s research and development at secret facilities and laboratories in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The bomb’s use on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, however, left him with grave misgivings, and he spent the ensuing years trying to prevent a nuclear arms race. He was horrified when US policymakers decided to develop a thermonuclear superbomb with destructive capabilities thousands of times greater than the original atomic bomb, and his arguments against it earned him powerful enemies. As anti-Communist sentiment intensified, those enemies dredged up Oppenheimer’s left-wing past to banish him from government councils. American Prometheus builds to his dramatic 1954 hearing before a special panel that voted to recommend revoking his security clearance. This humiliating inquisition occurred against the backdrop of McCarthyism. Bird and Sherwin, both Cold War historians, describe Oppenheimer as “the most prominent victim” of “McCarthyite hysteria” (548). From Sherwin’s initial publishing contract to the book’s initial printing, American Prometheus took 26 years to complete.

American Prometheus inspired the 2023 blockbuster film Oppenheimer, directed by Christopher Nolan.

Content Warning: The book and this guide include references to mental health crises, suicidal ideation, and multiple deaths by suicide.

Plot Summary

American Prometheus features a Preface, a Prologue, 40 chapters divided into five parts, and an Epilogue. As a comprehensive biography, the book proceeds chronologically. Each part corresponds to a period in Oppenheimer’s life.

Part 1 follows Oppenheimer from his birth in 1904 through his early thirties, when he established himself as a professor of theoretical physics at both Caltech and the University of California, Berkeley. Psychological and professional themes dominate these early chapters. Raised in a wealthy New York City family of Jewish descent, Oppenheimer enjoyed numerous advantages but also endured a sheltered childhood that contributed to an awkward adolescence, during which young Robert made few friends. His social isolation continued into young adulthood and resulted in mental health struggles. While studying abroad, he recovered from his deepest bout of depression and focused his energies on theoretical physics, which became his passion. Unlike many academics, however, Oppenheimer read widely outside his own discipline—for instance, he loved poetry—and this liberal education made his intellectual powers all the more formidable. Additionally, he realized that he loved theoretical, not experimental, physics. Thus, he developed a reputation as a great synthesizer, a scholar who could bring together many different facts or ideas and give them new meaning.

Part 2 describes both Oppenheimer’s complex political awakening and emergence as a leading figure in the US wartime quest to develop an atomic weapon. For much of his early life, Oppenheimer showed little interest in politics, but the events of the 1930s, highlighted by the Great Depression and the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany, convinced him to take a more active role in left-wing politics. He associated with many Communist sympathizers and Party members. Oppenheimer’s own connection to the Communist Party USA remains uncertain, though Bird and Sherwin conclude that the evidence points to his being nothing more than a standard 1930s liberal. Meanwhile, the discovery of fission in 1939 engaged many scientists in the problem of building an atomic weapon. Oppenheimer quickly became a prominent figure in the discussions that led to the atomic bomb program. By the end of 1942, General Leslie Groves had selected Oppenheimer to direct the bomb program at Los Alamos.

Part 3 covers Oppenheimer’s directorship at the Los Alamos laboratory. Urgency, efficiency, and secrecy defined the project, which Oppenheimer directed on-site from March 1943 through the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. He and his fellow scientists moved with urgency because they feared that the Nazis would develop the bomb first. Oppenheimer’s successful transformation from a university professor into a capable administrator greatly helped the project. Above all, the Los Alamos site preserved the project’s secrecy. Oppenheimer and his fellow scientists grew accustomed to high security. On this front, as on most others, he worked well with Groves. However, Los Alamos represented Oppenheimer’s first encounter with what he later grew to loathe as the “scourge of secrecy.” Hyper-paranoid counterintelligence officials sometimes caused unnecessary delays. Because of his left-wing past, even Oppenheimer was under surveillance. He remained focused on his job, however, so he had little time to think about the bomb’s usage or its postwar implications.

Part 4—the book’s lengthiest part—depicts how Oppenheimer grappled with the consequences of his achievement. Shortly after the successful Trinity test on July 16, 1945, his “mood began to change” (313). The Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks in August left him despondent. He spent much of late 1945 and 1946 trying to convince policymakers such as President Harry Truman that atomic energy should be subject to international control. After losing this argument, however, Oppenheimer drifted toward the emerging Cold War consensus. In January 1947, he agreed to chair the General Advisory Committee to the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). By then, he “was beginning to accept the idea of a defense posture supported by a multitude of nuclear weapons” (354). This ambivalence—horror over the atomic weapon but acknowledgement of its necessity—kept him a member in good standing of the US foreign policy establishment. In 1949, however, Oppenheimer began to drift away from the establishment’s consensus when he opposed the development of a thermonuclear superbomb. Its supporters then questioned his loyalty. As AEC chair, Lewis Strauss collaborated with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and others to initiate a formal review of Oppenheimer’s security file. In December 1953, he learned that his security clearance had been suspended and decided to fight the decision.

Part 5 details the 1954 security clearance hearing and its consequences. Strauss rigged the proceedings to produce the outcome he wanted: a recommendation to revoke Oppenheimer’s security clearance. The three-man panel of judges had read his classified file even before the hearing began, and the prosecutor had access to it, but Oppenheimer’s attorneys did not. The extrajudicial inquisition lasted nearly four weeks. Dozens of witnesses testified on his behalf. The panelists learned nothing that had not been in his file for years. In the context of McCarthyite rhetoric, however, Oppenheimer’s Communist associations assumed a sinister appearance, as did his opposition to the superbomb. Despite the stacked deck, one panelist voted in his favor, as did one member of the full five-man AEC. Nevertheless, the final decision went against the physicist who directed the US atomic bomb program. Some thought he emerged from the hearing as “a scientist martyred, like Galileo” (547). The ordeal chastened him, however: After 1954, he seldom ventured political opinions that strayed from the mainstream. From the mid-1950s onward, he and his wife, Kitty, often retreated to the isolated Caribbean island of St. John, where they built a beach cottage, and he found “refuge from his inner demons” (573). In his final years, Oppenheimer received honors and expressions of gratitude but ceased to again influence nuclear policy. That, according to Bird and Sherwin, was the point of his 1954 hearing. Oppenheimer died of cancer on February 18, 1967, at age 62.