Fear And Trembling

Fear and Trembling is an 1843 Christian philosophical tract written by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard and published under the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio (John of the Silence). The title refers to a passage from the Bible, which demands that “salvation” be worked out “with fear and trembling” (Philippians 2:12). Most of Fear and Trembling focuses on the biblical story of Abraham, whom God told to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham’s actions (despite his fear and trembling) cannot be understood, Kierkegaard writes, as anything but an act of faith. Most scholars view Fear and Trembling as partially autobiographical, reflecting Kierkegaard’s decision to leave his lover, Regine Olsen, to commit himself to theology. The tract is also considered a foundational text of existentialism, as it wrestles with the effort to find meaning in life and the role faith plays in that meaning. The work is widely read by theologians and philosophers today and has been cited in the work of later philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.

This guide follows the 2013 Princeton University Press edition translated by Walter Lowrie and published under the title Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death.

Summary

Fear and Trembling is divided into two parts. In the first, Kierkegaard examines the story of Abraham; in the second, he creates a framework for investigating Abraham’s faith and poses questions that arise from this framework. The work begins with a preface in which Kierkegaard (as Johannes de Silentio) introduces the reader to the current state of philosophy and his disagreement with the Hegelian “System.” In the brief “Prelude” that follows, he introduces the reader to four versions of the story of Abraham. The first section ends with the “Panegyric Upon Abraham,” which argues that there is no rational way one can understand Abraham or what he did and why.

The second section is titled “Problemata.” In the first part of it, the “Preliminary Expectoration,” Kierkegaard distinguishes the tragic hero and the knight of faith. The tragic hero sacrifices everything as part of the resignation required to accept what has been lost. In doing that, the tragic hero embodies and expresses the universal experience of being human. The knight of faith, on the other hand, goes beyond infinite resignation to faith. He gets everything he lost back through the absurdity that is faith. While humankind has long admired the tragic hero, no one can make sense of the knight of faith.

Finally, the work addresses three problems that arise from this framework. The first problem concerns whether there is such a thing as a teleological suspension of ethics. Abraham’s attempted murder of his son cannot be understood as part of universal ethics. Abraham, therefore, must have suspended universal ethics to fulfill the higher duty owed to God.

In the second problem, Kierkegaard asks about the absolute duty to God. He contrasts his beliefs with those of Hegel and Descartes, arguing that Abraham passed over all his ethical obligations to directly perform the task asked of him by God. Though he was tempted by his duty to the ethics of man, he ultimately avoided temptation.

The final problem discusses Abraham’s decision to hide his plans to sacrifice Isaac from those around him. Sharing information is an act for the universal while hiding information is an act by an individual. Abraham thus acted as a single individual, one separated from the needs of the universal. This means his actions cannot be explained (for who would understand them?). Faith requires passion, and passion cannot be taught or learned. To understand faith, we must experience passion.